What leader has the biggest headaches caused by the death of Osama bin-Laden? To be General Ashfaq Kayani, Commander of the Pakistan military and, as such, the most powerful man in the country where the head of al-Qaeda fugitives were hiding in plain sight.
Kayani is now faced with an escalation of tensions already level of crisis in the relationship with the main benefactor of his army, to the United States, whose billions of dollars in aid of the Pakistan army is first and foremost, to buy the cooperation against al-Qaeda. Of course, the United States and Pakistan have been disagree on the question of the Taliban since US forces for the first time in Afghanistan, but not on al-Qaeda - even at the time, General Pervez Musharraf essentially attempts to convince long Afghan proxy date of Pakistan to hand over bin Laden. Over the years that followed intelligence Pakistani service had helped roll U.S. hundreds of senior officers of the movement, including terrorist attacks of September 11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Even network Haqqani, the most militant groups Taliban who has a relationship with al-Qaeda, but also with the ISI, was probably based on a Pakistani perspective on the need to maintain influence in the post Afghanistan and the United States. (See the photos of the Lair of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan).
Although it is difficult to imagine the bin Ladens management set up a fortress-mansion worthy of a kingpin narco within spitting distance of the equivalent of the Pakistan's West Point but not raising questions in what is essentially a police stateIt is also difficult to see a motivation for Pakistan hiding of bin Laden of his American pursuers.
Even if Pakistan has always operated on the basis of its own interests in Afghanistan security - which are not the same as those of the United States and include a desire to restore at least a part of the power of his Taliban agents - Kabul masking of bin Laden would appear to be paradoxical: After all, establishing security Pakistan seeks the United States at the end of its mission in Afghanistan, Pakistani generals who consider the root cause of their insurgency domestic. Which seems, on the contrary, to encourage the creation of Pakistani security to help America find and eliminate bin Laden, because its withdrawal of the scene creates a a ramp of exit for the Americans begin to leave the Afghanistan.(See the obituary Osama bin Laden).
(A counterargument, perhaps, could be that because the pursuit of al-Qaeda makes benefactor of U.S. of Pakistan treat military leadership of this country with kid gloves, the deletion of Ben Laden factor may invite Washington to become much less forgiving of a State of nuclear weapons)(, savers extremists.)
But it really depends what we mean by "Pakistan". The civil government ostensibly gives the military its marching orders, but it is a fiction that anyone bothers to support seriously. And even in the security of telecommunications, it is quite conceivable - even apparent, sometimes in the past - that various elements continue sometimes competitors agendas. Whatever the explanation, however, it is likely that the episode of bin Laden a dangerous irritant for intelligence and security U.S. - Pakistan relationship already quickly quickly deteriorating. Military of Kayani has badly need this U.S. allowance, which will have a cost of increasing pressure to provide satisfactory account to articulate the suspicion of a double game. (See pictures of Osama bin Laden).
Again, outrage Pakistani cooling on all savers of bin Laden U.S. is only half the problem of the Kayani: the other half will be the fact that it will be the violent reaction of followers of Osama bin Laden and allies in Pakistanwhich assume that the Pakistani authorities were accomplices in the raid of Ben Laden U.S., just as they assume Pakistani complicity in the drone in the wars in Waziristan. Reports indicate that militants in the tribal areas consider break different ceasefire agreements and to revive domestic insurrection inspired by the army in the fight against a civil war. It is Pakistani not Americans will pay the highest price in the blood of vengeance wrought by the acolytes of bin Laden.
Pakistan may be the only country where al-Qaeda is always ready to achieve its key objective cause of jihadist-led rebellions against regimes in Muslim countries aligned with the West. While most of the Arab and Muslim world has largely ignored bin Laden, even when they have increased to challenge the U.S.-backed dictatorships, Pakistan is probably the only country in the world where the death of Osama bin Laden will be marked by angry crowds in the streetsbrandishing his portrait. These elements are not the majority of Pakistanis, of course, but they are much more numerous and present in the streets of Pakistan as they are in most other Muslim countries that bin Laden had hoped to rally to its flag. In the Arab world, his death has been greeted largely with a collective shrug by the people who are fighting their own local political battles with al-Qaeda is not relevant, except when its threat is cited as an excuse by tyrants to retain power. (See pictures of a jihadist trip.)
The American invasion of the Afghanistan 2001 caused by the September 11 attacks fueled anti-American sentiments existing in Pakistan to a lot of fever: when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the regime of Pakistan had actively encouraged - with the support of the United States - its citizens to go next door and the fight against the occupier "infidels". And the Pakistani public was not more tolerant of an invasion us was of a Soviet - thousands of Pakistani went across the border, once more, to fight against the "infidels", and many in Pakistan's military establishment see the presence us nearby as the key factor in the Taliban extremism inside.
Generals of Pakistan, then, have been caught since 2001 between requiring their ally and patron of the Arts in Washington, and appease their anti-American public - while the majority of the Pakistani not bin Laden, they are still more hostile to the United States now than they were in 2001. The result has been a growing domestic extremism expressed even on purely national issues such as the persecution of Pakistani Christians and political marginalization of those more inclined to cooperate with the West. (Watch the announcement of President Obama of the death of Osama Ben Laden.)
Thus the dilemma of the Kayani: The U.S. requires probably now with more in the more urgent, that he has to do more to tackle the supporters of Osama bin Laden and other extremist groups on its soil; a large part of its own public reprimand him are too. Pakistan regime is not in danger of being overthrown, which would have preferred that Ben Laden. But al-Qaeda a better Pakistan, elsewhere, in a corner of conduct between a pro-Western regime and its own people, on the basis of its cooperation against the jihadists and open cooperation with the United States more and more untenable.
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